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“DE MINIMIS ‘DIMINI-MISSED?’”
How Threat Threatened, But Preserved,
Title VII’s Materially Adverse Requirement in
§703(a)(1) Employment Discrimination Actions
By Michael Mahoney and Lucas Allison
In McDonnell Douglas v. Green, the Supreme Court stated “[t]he broad, overriding interest, shared by employer,
employee, and consumer, is efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and racially neutral
employment and personnel decisions. In the implementation of such decisions, it is abundantly clear that that Title
VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise.”1 (Emphasis added.) As Title VII is currently interpreted by
American courts, this is simply not true. Proof of discrimination alone has never been enough, though courts initially
understood that Congress intended to let the law grow and change over time to reflect new social attitudes.2
Threat v. City of Cleveland

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (commonly referred to as “Title
VII”) is the portion of that law focused on discrimination against
employees by employers.3 In §703(a)(1), Title VII describes unlawful
employment practices:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.
. . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
because of such individual’s race. . .4
In July 2021, Cleveland EMS captains brought a Title VII lawsuit
against the City of Cleveland and their supervisor, Nicole Carlton.
Carlton made decisions on how to assign captains to shifts based
on their race: To “diversify” shifts, Carlton moved a number of

Black captains from their preferred day shift to the night shift. The
captains recognized that these shift changes were improper and,
consequently, filed suit against Carlton and the City of Cleveland.
However, the trial court turned Threat and the other plaintiffs away.
The District Court decided that, “[the Plaintiffs] must still show a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Defendants took a
materially adverse employment action against them.”5 (Emphasis
added.) In other words, prior Sixth Circuit cases have held that
shift changes are not harmful to employees. Therefore, the Court
dismissed the captains’ complaint as de minimis non curat lex, or
“the law does not concern itself with trifles.”6
As shown above, Title VII §703(a)(1) mentions an employee’s “terms,
conditions, or privileges” of employment, but does not mention
“materially adverse” anywhere.7 Despite the absence of “materially
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adverse” in the language of §703(a)(1),
the Sixth Circuit has consistently applied
the de minimis standard in prior §703(a)
(1) cases. Ultimately, the Court adopts
language from §703(b), the “materially
adverse” requirement, and introduces a
test applicable to that part of the law (the
de minimis standard) to fact patterns
inappropriately. The Department of Justice
asserted as much in its brief in support of
neither party.8
This raises the question: What does
“materially adverse” really mean in §703(a)
(1) employment discrimination cases? In the
Sixth Circuit, “materially adverse” used to
mean that shift changes were de minimis
harms—a mere “trifle.” Threat has called
this precedent into question, but under very
specific factual circumstances

A case of first impression

Threat was the first employment
discrimination case in the Sixth Circuit
involving a shift change that altered both
a term and privilege of employment under
§703(a)(1). This presented the Court with
an opportunity to shine new light onto the
application of §703(a)(1) to discriminatory
shift change cases. Unfortunately, instead
of breaking down each key term of §703(a)
(1) and clarifying the weight and scope of
each term, the Court produced an analytical
half-measure, and missed the opportunity to
simplify Title VII: instead of removing hurdles
for Title VII plaintiffs, the Sixth Circuit lowered
these hurdles to an unclear degree in an
uncertain number of situations.9
In this paper, the authors address Threat’s
key takeaway: that an employer is now less
likely to successfully claim an employment
action is de minimis under Title VII §703(a)(1)
than before Threat. This conclusion seems
to run against the Supreme Court’s decisions
in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth10
and Burlington Northern and Santa Fe, two
cases that outline the de minimis standard
for Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, §
704.11 Part II discusses in greater detail the
facts of Threat v. City of Cleveland, Ohio,
and the Court’s holding.12 Part III analyzes
the Court’s reasoning, and explains why
the Court’s analysis of the facts is both
unhelpful and problematic. Part IV discusses
the ramifications of Threat. Part V concludes
with an attempt to solve the riddle and
make Threat more informative for other
courts and potential litigants.

Threat’s facts and the court’s holding

In Cleveland, EMS captains are assigned
shifts through a seniority-based bidding
system, “giving longer-tenured captains
shift preference.”13 In 2017, EMS captains
bid for their 2018 shift assignments, and
the bidding system produced a day shift
staffed entirely by Black captains.14 The EMS
Commissioner, Nicole Carlton, reassigned
Reginald Anderson, a Black captain, to
the night shift over his seniority-based
objection and replaced him with a white
captain to “diversify the shift.”15 When
Anderson voiced frustration with Carlton’s
race-based shift reassignment, Carlton
asked all captains to rebid for their shifts.16
When the rebidding process reproduced
a day shift staffed by all Black captains,
Carlton again reassigned Anderson to
the night shift and replaced him with a
white captain.17 Anderson and four other
Black captains filed a Title VII employment
discrimination action against the City of
Cleveland and Commissioner Carlton.18
The district court granted Carlton’s motion
for summary judgement on the employment
discrimination claim, holding that the
shift reassignment was not a “materially
adverse employment action).”19 The Sixth
Circuit reversed, finding that Anderson had
presented sufficient evidence to support a
finding that Carlton’s discriminatory shift
change was more than a mere trifle.20
In holding that the shift assignment was
“materially adverse,” the Court stated,
“[S]urely the distinction between an
8:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m. start time is a
term of employment. How could the
when of employment not be a term of
employment?”21 As to Anderson’s seniority
privileges, the Court concluded that his
seniority-based privileges of employment
were altered when Carlton changed his
shift based on his race over his objections.22
Ultimately, the court held that “[w]hen an
employee’s race is a basis for a shift change
that denies the privileges of that employee’s
seniority, the employer has discriminated on
the basis of race in the terms and privileges
of employment.”23

The Court’s reasoning: pulling together
terms and privileges of employment
Threat was the first Sixth Circuit case to
address both a term and a privilege of
employment in a Title VII §703(a)(1) claim.

For lower courts, attorneys and litigants
looking to the Sixth Circuit for guidance,
one would imagine that the Court would
thoughtfully lay out how Anderson’s
seniority-based privileges impacted the
materially adverse analysis. Instead, the
Court merely provides dictionary definitions
of “term” and “privilege,” then states that,
Pulling the meaning of these key
terms together… [t]he race-based
shift change. . . prohibited [Anderson]
from exercising his seniority rights,
and diminished his supervisory
responsibilities when the city imposed
the night shift on him.24

The City and Carlton attacked this reasoning.
Both argued that under Title VII, employee
lawsuits must state a claim using the words
materially “adverse employment action.”25
The Court rejected their interpretation,
reasoning that whether an employee states
her claim using the words “discrimination
based on race in ‘terms’ or ‘privileges’ of
employment” or “discrimination based
on race in materially adverse terms of
employment,” the conclusion is the same:
a cognizable Title VII claim.26
The Court’s reasoning is unhelpful and
problematic. The reasoning is unhelpful
because it does not specify how the
Court weighed Anderson’s senioritybased privileges when it conducted the
“materially adverse” analysis. Readers
are left to wonder how, and under what
circumstances, Sixth Circuit courts should
weigh employment privileges that define
the scope and importance of an employee’s
terms of employment.
The Court’s reasoning is also problematic:
by reasoning that “materially adverse
terms” is not required language in a Title VII
lawsuit, and that discrimination based on
race in ‘terms’ or ‘privileges’ of employment
is sufficient, the Court clarified one issue
but created another. The Court’s reasoning
blurs the line between the race-based
shift change and the race-based erosion
of Anderson’s seniority-based privileges.
Readers must wonder what role Anderson’s
seniority-based privileges played in the
“materially adverse” analysis. The Court
continued on next page >
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never indicated any meaningful difference
between the race-based shift change and
the race-based erosion of Anderson’s
seniority-based privileges. As far as one can
tell, the Court merely determined that the
shift change was “materially adverse” and
concluded, therefore, the employment action
was also “materially adverse” to Anderson’s
seniority-based privileges.
By “pulling the meaning of these key terms
together,” the Court also pulled together the
analysis of the race-based shift change and
race-based erosion of Anderson’s seniority
privileges. This was an incredible mistake.
The Court missed a valuable opportunity
to explain how the presence of a senioritybased privilege affects the “materially
adverse” analysis. “Like the game of
telephone,” the Court’s silence on how a
privilege affects the “materially adverse”
analysis has created a risk that Sixth Circuit
courts will “convert the ultimate message”
of Threat “into something quite different
from the original message”:27 that a privilege
which affects a term is reducible to the term
itself.

Threat’s implications

The most serious ramification of Threat is
that the de minimis standard is weakened.
The Threat court “sweeps in” a substantial
amount of materiality and adversity to either
a term or to a privilege of employment when
discrimination occurs on the basis of race,
and provides little clarity on the interaction
of those two elements, as discussed above.
This new development for the Sixth Circuit
loosens the harm and injury requirements
of Title VII litigation. Nevertheless, because
the Court chose to analyze “terms” and
“privileges” together, Threat has a safety
valve: another judge could have the same
fact pattern in front of her, save for a union
bargaining for the privilege of choosing
shifts, and that Court could say that the de
minimis threshold has not been reached. The
“privilege” negotiated by the union in Threat
is not present, so the same employer action
yields a different result.
Scaling the de minimis threshold back
is ultimately a positive development for
workers who are discriminated against by
their employers, but the change also has
an ambiguous scope. At face value, more
claims should be able to pass summary
judgment if they can prove discrimination,

which will give the law more teeth in
litigation. But it’s never quite that simple—
what will come when an employer decides
to appeal an adverse summary judgment
ruling? The Court held here that “When
an employee’s race is a basis for a shift
change that denies the privileges of that
employee’s seniority, the employer has
discriminated on the basis of race in the
terms and privileges of employment.”28
(Emphasis added.) This compound ruling
leaves wiggle room for a less sympathetic
judge to apply the de minimis standard with
respect to a term or privilege if either one
exists in isolation. Where Threat weakens
this de minimis standard and recognizes
the harm in discrimination itself, a case
without a union to establish a privilege may
not make a compelling enough showing of
harm. Because the Court does not discuss
the terms in isolation, and because the shift
change has been seen as de minimis by the
Sixth Circuit in situations where a worker’s
union did not establish a privilege to select
a shift, Threat may not actually depart from
the previous decisions as radically as it first
appears. This would make Threat a much less
significant and much more narrow precedent.
Another weakness of Threat as precedent
is the Sixth Circuit precedent that changes
to employee shifts are almost always de
minimis.29 The District Court recognized
“no material difference between a day shift
and night shift” in Threat, and decisions as
recent as 2020 held this seemingly contrary
position to Threat.30 The Court’s decision
in Threat was not appealed, so it will not
be heard en banc by the Sixth Circuit. But
if a similar fact pattern emerges, Threat’s
language about shift changes may prevail
over this rather extensive body of case law.
Additionally, experts are unsure how the
Threat ruling may impact an employer’s
diversity initiatives.31 While an initiative
should never cause harm to an applicant or
employee, an employer may struggle to craft
an initiative without a clear definition of Title
VII harm. The Threat court was unwilling
to say shift changes show a materially
adverse action in all cases despite making
clear that shift hours are always a term of
employment.
Because of this ambiguity from the Court,
a worker whose shift is changed by his or
her employer will not know the chances of
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success in a lawsuit. A worker without a
union would be discouraged from filing a
Title VII lawsuit due to the narrowness of
Threat. Also, while employers are more likely
to settle now than before Threat, they would
be more inclined to settle these cases if the
Court more firmly stated these involuntary
shift changes with discriminatory intent (or
pretext) are categorically impermissible. From
the employer’s perspective, the law is unclear
as to how much an employer can change an
employee’s shift before it becomes a Title
VII infraction, and this “we will know it when
we see it” type of jurisprudence may worry
employers who are making good faith efforts
to comply with the law.
Down the road, the Sixth Circuit could
become a bright red thumb in the
jurisprudence on Title VII, diverging from
Supreme Court precedent in similar cases
such as Burlington Northern and Santa Fe.32
The split between §§703 and 704 may draw
attention to the issue, as the majority of
these prior cases deal solely with §704.33
Because these retaliation cases have defined
a materially adverse employment action, the
Supreme Court may draw from Burlington
Northern or Ellerth to help define the term
in this context. The current disposition of
the Supreme Court on this issue is unclear,
but there has been an undeniable ideological
shift in the Court over the past five years.
Additionally, a more liberal Supreme Court
ruled on at least one previous 5-4 decision on
Title VII early in the decade that significantly
narrowed Title VII workplace harassment
claims.34 Pulling the two together, there is
cause for concern about the future of §703(a)
(1) Title VII requirements if the Supreme Court
weighs in.
As it stands, Threat has been cited for its
holding on one occasion by the D.C. Circuit
about a month after the case was decided
in Smith v. Blinken.35 It is unclear how
influential Threat will be outside the Sixth
Circuit, but it has already been used in a
judge’s opinion denying summary judgment
on a Title VII action. That is remarkable,
and the authors hope Threat continues to
press the issue when used as a precedent
to avoid granting summary judgment.
For the reasons outlined in this paper,
the authors have reservations about the
long-term viability of Threat to do this, but
perhaps Smith v. Blinken will be the start of
a positive trend.

Threat had the potential to be a much
stronger precedent for §703(a)(1) claims
under Title VII. It seems the Court wanted
to toe the line between the Sixth Circuit’s
prior decisions that applied the de minimis
standard in §703(1) while moving toward the
position of the Department of Justice that
no threshold for a discriminatory employer
action exists.36 In choosing to toe this line,
the de minimis standard is weakened, so it
should be easier for employees suing in the
Sixth Circuit to show they have a case. That
is a step in the right direction, and it should
be commended even if it is ultimately a halfmeasure.
If one must live with Threat, what needs to
be clarified in future cases? Above all, the
“terms,” “privileges” and “conditions” of
this opinion need to be sorted with respect
to the “materially adverse” test the Court
preserved. Each of these three words carries
some weight in the analysis performed by
the Threat Court, but how much weight is
given to each word and at what balance is
unclear.37 If Threat is going to be a useful
template for other courts, then clarifying
the threshold for an action on these factors
when discrimination occurs is key.
For example, the decision could have said
that a shift change exceeds the de minimis
threshold with respect to “terms” when
a shift is changed from day to night, or
perhaps a twelve-hour change in shift
times is material per se. Alternatively, those
facts could give a plaintiff a rebuttable
presumption, making the employer prove
that the harm caused by this action was not
substantial enough. This could be repeated
for “conditions” (which were left untouched
by Threat) and “privileges.” It is not a
perfect solution, but this direction would
have been clearer than “§703(a)(1) means
what we have said it means.”38 Additionally
and most importantly, this solution would
make employers work harder to dismiss a
complaint that has merit under §703(a)(1).
However, at the outset, the authors
remarked that the decision in Threat was a
missed opportunity. It was a chance for the
Court to stop reading in language that is not
found in the law being applied. The Court
refused to take that step, claiming it “cannot
just toss the de minimis rule aside.”39 As the
authors observed, this is simply not true;
courts made that rule, and courts could stop

applying it tomorrow. As the McDonnell
Douglas decision stated, “it is abundantly
clear that that Title VII tolerates no racial
discrimination.”40 The Sixth Circuit took a
step in the right direction, but refused to
continue walking to the proper conclusion.41
The authors have offered bridge analyses
that might make this decision workable,
but the ultimate solution is to live up to the
words of the McDonnell Douglas court and
tolerate no discrimination.42
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